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The Nature and Minimum Standards of  
Freedom of Religion or Belief 
Natan Lerner∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article provides an overview of the nature and scope of the 
minimum standards for freedom of religion or belief in the interna-
tional community, as regulated by the principal international norms. 
Although the international community had already addressed racial 
discrimination, racial hatred, and other human rights issues, the 
United Nations did not address racial and religious discrimination 
and intolerance until the early sixties, following a series of anti-
Semitic outbreaks. The United Nations separated the issues and 
promptly drafted a declaration and convention against racial dis-
crimination. However, the United Nations did not draft a declara-
tion regarding religion and belief until 1981. Moreover, it does not 
appear the United Nations will draft a convention regarding religion 
and belief any time soon, for reasons discussed hereafter.1 
International organizations have adopted measures intended to 
guarantee freedom of religion or belief at the global and regional 
levels. These measures have also had some influence on domestic leg-
 
 ∗ The author teaches international law at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and 
international human rights at the Faculty of Law of Tel Aviv University, from which he retired 
as an associate professor. Mr. Lerner is the author of the following books: RELIGION, BELIEFS 
AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); and THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL 
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (1970). 
 1. See infra Part IV.C.4. Scholarly literature regarding human rights was criticized for 
similarly failing to sufficiently address religion, belief, and related issues. This deficiency has 
been remedied in recent years. Today, there are a fair number of books and articles available 
that address religion and beliefs and the minimum standards and norms that prevail in the area. 
See, e.g., MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 
(1997); NATAN LERNER, RELIGION, BELIEFS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS (2000); 
RELIGION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: BASIC DOCUMENTS (Ted Stahnke & J. Paul Martin eds., 
1998); RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES (Johan 
D. van der Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds., 1996) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS]; 
BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: ENSURING EFFECTIVE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROTECTION (1996). 
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islation. The measures address issues such as (1) the nature, scope, 
and other substantive aspects of freedom of religion or belief; inner- 
and outer-religious freedoms; the expression and manifestation of 
the freedom; permissible limitations and derogation of the freedom; 
and how the freedom clashes or interacts with other individual and 
collective rights, and (2) the procedural aspects available to protect 
individuals’ fundamental rights of freedom of religion or belief, in-
cluding freedom from religion. Some countries have unilaterally ad-
dressed the second issue, while other countries have entered into 
special arrangements with other countries, churches, religious com-
munities, and congregations. 
This article attempts to briefly inventory these measures, which 
govern the sensitive issue of freedom of religion or belief. Where ap-
propriate, this article also refers to other international instruments 
that indirectly impact freedom of religion or belief and to the inter-
action between freedom of religion or belief and other rights, includ-
ing the freedoms of expression, association, and communication; 
gender rights; the rights of indigenous people and other special 
populations, such as migrant workers; educational rights; and chil-
dren’s rights. This article also alludes to problems concerning the re-
lationship between the religious group and its individual members 
and the religious group (be it a religious congregation or commu-
nity) and the state. Other articles in this Symposium address several 
of these issues in more depth. 
II. THE NEED FOR THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO ADDRESS 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 
With the beginning of a new millennium, the international 
community’s continued efforts and interest in development, ad-
vancement, and technology present the ineluctable question of 
whether the international community is likewise ready to make addi-
tional advancements in the area of freedom of religion or belief by, 
perhaps, adopting a mandatory treaty based upon an existing draft or 
other instrument. Conversely, if the international community sees 
this next step as premature, undesirable, or risky, the question be-
comes whether it is possible to agree upon another way to place 
freedom of religion or belief on equal footing with other basic hu-
man rights. 
None of the several suggestions and proposals to that effect ade-
quately answer why this essential manifestation of human liberty has 
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received less attention than other fundamental rights. Indeed, relig-
ion profoundly impacts the state of the world. Tragic events that 
demonstrate the powerful influence of ethnicity and religion, and in 
some cases require the intervention of massive international force, 
are but additional proof that religion plays a weighty role in xeno-
phobia, racism, group hatred, and even territorial changes. Further-
more, religious persecution and conflicts between believers and non-
believers; between different churches in multireligious societies; be-
tween dominating, protected, or preferred religions and religious 
minorities; and between newly established religions are all common 
phenomena. Some even argue that a shift from violence between 
sovereign states to conflicts between ethnic and religious groups is 
taking place.2 In fact, the problem is so pervasive that the United 
States, the major political force in the world, considered it necessary 
to go through the complicated legislative process (legally and other-
wise) to enact domestic legislation to protect endangered religious 
groups abroad.3 These problems, and the United States’ response, 
suggest the time is ripe for the international community to give 
equal attention to freedom of religion or belief. 
III. “RELIGION” DEFINED 
The notion of “religion” is difficult to define in legal terms. To 
avoid philosophical and ideological controversy, international and 
human rights law have prescribed a catalog of rights and the means 
of protecting those rights, under the agreed heading of “freedom of 
thought, conscience, and religion,” rather than defining the free-
doms themselves. All of the basic instruments refer to these three 
freedoms. Moreover, most of the developed international norms pro-
tect the manifestations or expressions of the freedom of religion or 
belief.4 
 
 2. See TRANSNATIONAL RELIGION AND FADING STATES 3-4 (Susanne Hober Rudolf & 
James Piscatori eds., 1997). See also SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS 
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996), which caused considerable controversy. 
 3. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM (1999); International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.  105-292, 112 
Stat. 2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1998)). 
 4. Problems exist with regard to new religious movements and sects, an issue that 
sparked emotional debates in many countries and led some to enact special provisions. The 
United Nations Rapporteur on Religious Freedom has dealt with this subject in his recent re-
ports. See the reports submitted by Abdelfattah Amor to the Commission on Human Rights 
since his appointment in 1987, the last of which is, before this writing, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/ 
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A major politically-motivated confrontation between Western 
and Communist countries was avoided by inserting “belief” after 
“religion.” The terms are intended to refer to both theistic views of 
the universe, as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other 
views excluding religion and religious norms.5 
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
A. Early Protection of Religious Freedom 
Historically, the protection of religious freedom preceded the 
protection of other rights.6 It commenced with provisions in bilateral 
treaties modifying the traditional rule, cuius regio eius religio, a weak, 
limited ad hoc system that only worked in favor of those religious 
minorities that a signatory state sought to protect, usually on the 
grounds of reciprocity.7 Other states unilaterally extended diplomatic 
protection to persecuted religious minorities. Still other states 
adopted the principle of religious tolerance and promulgated some 
rules on religious freedom in their legislation.8 The Augsburg 
(1555), Westphalia (1648), and Vienna (1815) treaties were impor-
tant stages in this development, showing that the international 
community was relatively accepting of the principle of humanitarian 
 
58 (1999). On June 22, 1999, the Council of Europe adopted the Recommendation 1412, 
Illegal Activities of Sects, EUR. PARL. ASS. DEB. 18TH Sess. (June 22, 1999). The Council con-
sidered it “undesirable” to enact major legislation on sects and reaffirmed its commitment to 
freedom of conscience and religion. Id. 
 5. I have listed judicial attempts to define religion and references from legal dictionar-
ies in my book, LERNER, supra note 1, at 3-4. See also TAHZIB, supra note 1, at 1-3; 
RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1. 
 6. See John P. Humphrey, Political and Related Rights, in 1 HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 176 (Theodor Meron ed., 1985); Karl Josef Partsch, Freedom of 
Conscience and Expression, and Political Freedoms, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS 
209 (Louis Henkin ed., 1981); PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN 
RIGHTS (1983). 
 7. At this stage (the 16th century) the abandonment of this traditional rule—that the 
sovereign’s religion should be the religion of everyone under his jurisdiction—did not imply 
the establishment of a general freedom of religion. 
 8. On these early developments, see ALESSANDRA LUINI DEL RUSSO, INTERNATIONAL 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1971). See also, EVANS, supra note 1, at 42. On religious 
rights and minorities, see generally Natan Lerner, The Evolution of Minority Rights in Interna-
tional Law, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77-101 (Catherine Brol-
mann et al. eds., 1993), and PATRICK THORNBERRY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RIGHTS OF 
MINORITIES (1991). 
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intervention. Such intervention was on pragmatic grounds, however, 
without any philosophical or legal justification. This period culmi-
nated with the French and American revolutions.9 
B. Post-World War I Protection of Religious Freedom 
The next relevant step toward the protection of religious free-
dom was the unsuccessful, but interesting, regime that developed af-
ter World War I based upon Article 22 of the Covenant of the 
League of Nations, which guaranteed freedom of conscience and re-
ligion. Treaties and states’ unilateral statements on religious freedom 
sought to ensure the protection of national, ethnic, religious, cul-
tural, and linguistic minorities.10 This protection included individual 
and collective religious rights. This system failed, however, with the 
breakdown of the League of Nations, a consequence of the general 
political situation preceding World War II. 
C. Post-World War II Protection of Religious Freedom 
After the 1945 San Francisco Conference and the establishment 
of the United Nations, the international community, suspicious of 
the validity and genuineness of the assertion of collective and group 
(including religious group) rights, shifted its emphasis from protect-
ing collective and group rights to affording protection to individual 
persons on the basis of individual rights and nondiscrimination. Per-
sons whose rights were violated or jeopardized because of a group 
characteristic—be it race, color, religion, ethnic or national origin, 
culture, or language—would now be protected purely on an individ-
ual basis.11 The issue of minority group rights, although not com-
 
 9. On religious rights under national law, see ARCOT KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF 
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2, U.N. Sales No. 60.XIV.2 (1960). 
 10. The literature on the minority treaties is immense and cannot be listed here. Recent 
works include FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO 
ETHNIC, RELIGIOUS AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES (1991), especially Chapter IV; Felix Erma-
cora, The Protection of Minorities Before the United Nations, in RECUEIL DES COURS 182/IV 
247, 347 (1983); NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND DISCRIMINATION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991); THORNBERRY, supra note 8; and THE PROTECTION OF 
MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992). On the inter-
war experience, see JACOB ROBINSON ET AL., WERE THE MINORITIES TREATIES A FAILURE? 
(1943). 
 11. See Lerner, supra note 8; WARWICK MCKEAN, EQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW (1983). 
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pletely ignored, was not addressed in the early United Nations texts 
mainly because several member states were dealing with minority 
problems and the discredit of the inter-war system.12 
An important exception to the international community’s failure 
to address group rights was the International Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide 
Convention”), adopted on December 9, 1948, one day before the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.13 Article II of the Genocide 
Convention specifically includes in the notion of genocide the intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a “religious group.”14 Although the 
victims of the crime will always be individuals, the target of the crime 
is the group, be it religious or otherwise. The Genocide Convention 
clearly addresses crimes such as those committed in the 1990s under 
the guise of “ethnic—meaning also religious— cleansing.”15 
1. Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Except for prohibiting the discrimination of persons on religious 
grounds, the United Nations Charter does not deal specifically with 
religious rights. The first United Nations instrument to address the 
subject was the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“Universal Declaration”).16 The seminal Article 18 greatly influ-
enced the 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights,17 the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,18 the re-
 
 12. See Lerner, supra note 8; THORNBERRY, supra note 8; Lerner, Religious Human 
Rights under the United Nations, in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 79, 85-86. 
 13. For the text of the Genocide Convention, see INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
INSTRUMENTS 130.1 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 2d ed. 1990) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS]. On the subject generally, see NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE GENOCIDE 
CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY (1960).  
 14. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1. Article II refers to “na-
tional, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such.” Id. 
 15. On the international community’s response to ethnic cleansing in the 1990s, see 
infra Part IV.D. 
 16. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 440.1. On the Universal 
Declaration, see generally John P. Humphrey, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Its 
History, Impact and Juridical Character, in HUMAN RIGHTS, THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 21 (1979); NEHEMIAH ROBINSON, THE UNIVERSAL 
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: ITS ORIGIN, SIGNIFICANCE, APPLICATION, AND 
INTERPRETATION (1958); and THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A 
COMMENTARY (Asbjørn Eide and Gudmundur Alfredsson eds., 1992), particularly Martin 
Scheinin’s article, Article 18, contained therein at 263. 
 17. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 180.1. 
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gional treaties, and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief 
(“1981 Declaration”).19 It reads: 
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion. This right shall include freedom to have a religion or 
whatever belief of his choice, and freedom either individually or in 
community with others and in public or private to manifest his re-
ligion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.20 
Article 18 consists of three parts. First, it guarantees the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, generally described as 
the forum internum.21 This is a broad category, which includes the 
right to profess a religion or to profess none, i.e., to believe or not 
believe. The term “belief” twice follows the term “religion.”22 “Be-
lief” should be interpreted strictly in connection with the word “re-
ligion.” It does not refer to political, economic, scientific, or other 
beliefs. The term “belief” was incorporated into the Universal Decla-
ration to protect the right to profess nonreligious or atheistic convic-
tions. 
It may be legitimate to consider the freedoms of conscience and 
religion as included in the freedom of thought. However, freedom of 
conscience was not universally considered a consolidated legal con-
cept at the time of the drafting of Article 18. This freedom is fre-
quently discussed under the heading of “conscientious objection,” 
not an exclusively religion-related issue. The reference to “freedom 
of conscience” was incorporated despite some opposition. The 
phrase refers to pacifism, obedience to superior orders, the power of 
the state to impose obligations in areas such as taxation, and other 
controversial problems regarding matters of principle for the individ-
ual. 
Second, Article 18 addresses conversion and religious prose-
lyting,23 issues that became more difficult when the 1966 Covenants 
and the 1981 Declaration were drafted.24 By the time those docu-
 
 18. See id. at 170.1. 
 19. See id. at 490.1. 
 20. Id. at 490.2. 
 21. See id. at 440.4. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See id. 
 24. For a discussion of the 1966 Covenants and the 1981 Declaration, see infra Part 
IV.C.3 and Part IV.C.4, respectively. 
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ments were drafted, the right to teach and disseminate one’s religion 
and to conduct proselyting activities became controversial matters. 
Those matters are beyond the scope of this article. They may some-
times involve a clash with rights such as privacy, interference with the 
integrity of some group identities—as when ethnicity and religion 
are closely related—and even illegal acts. Such illegal acts may in-
clude the abuse of conversion and proselyting rights, coercion of 
“captive audiences,” and the use of improper enticements. 
Third, Article 18 addresses the external forum or, put another 
way, the manifestations of religious freedom.25 Unlike freedom of 
thought and conscience, which can only be limited by complicated 
psychological techniques that influence the human mind, problems 
arise regarding manifestations of religious rights because those rights 
are more likely to be derogated. Given these problems, this aspect of 
religious freedom deserves special scrutiny. 
2. The Krishnaswami study 
Arcot Krishnaswami’s study,26 submitted in 1959, was an impor-
tant step in the United Nations’ identification and protection of reli-
gious freedoms.27 The study was based on information contained in 
82 country monographs and established principles that the Sub-
Commission later adopted, and which had considerable influence on 
future documents. The 1981 Declaration28 and pending Draft Con-
vention29 incorporate many of its principles. The study did not define 
the term “religion” but did clarify that the term “beliefs” included 
attitudes concerning religion such as agnosticism, atheism, and ra-
tionalism, in addition to theistic creeds.  However, these terms are 
not defined either. 
Krishnaswami analyzed the notions of freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion as legal rights.30 He referred to the prohibition 
of discrimination, dealt with the crucial issue of proselyting and con-
version, and detailed the contents of the right to manifest religion, as 
 
 25. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 440.4. 
 26. Krishnaswami was appointed as Special Rapporteur by the Sub-Commission on Pre-
vention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
 27. See KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 9. 
 28. For a discussion of the 1981 Declaration, see infra Part IV.C.4. 
 29. For a discussion of the Draft Convention, see infra Part IV.C.4. 
 30. See KRISHNASWAMI, supra note 9, at 13-14. 
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well as permissible limitations on it.31 He also dealt with the nature 
and rights of religious organizations; the relationship between those 
organizations and their members; and the scope of the concepts of 
teaching, practice, worship, and observance, embracing all possible 
manifestations of religion.32 Krishnaswami stressed the collective as-
pects of religious rights: assembly, association, organization, and in-
ternational ties and contacts.33 
Krishnaswami’s catalog of religious rights embraces worship, 
processions, pilgrimages, symbols, funeral practices, marriage and di-
vorce, teaching, and appointment of personnel.34 He also lists per-
missible limitations on religious rights and discusses oaths, objection 
to military service and other conscientious objections, compulsory 
medical treatment, and other particularly difficult issues.35 Further, 
he discusses different approaches to the state-religion and state-
religious community relationship.36 
3. The 1966 Covenants 
The United Nations took the next step in identifying and pro-
tecting religious rights when it promulgated the 1966 International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights37 and the 1966 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.38 Eighteen 
years had elapsed since the adoption of the Universal Declaration. 
Despite the evolution of legal thought during that time, which influ-
enced instruments such as the 1965 Convention on Racial Discrimi-
nation (“1965 Convention”),39 the text of the 1966 Covenants re-
 
 31. See id. at 16-18. 
 32. See id. at 15, 18-19. 
 33. See id. at 18-19. 
 34. See id. at 26-36. 
 35. See id. at 36-39. 
 36. See id. at 39-46. 
 37. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 180.1. 
 38. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.1. Some of the many 
works on the 1966 Covenants are Philip Alston, The Commission on Human Rights, in THE 
UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126 (Philip Alston ed., 1992); DOMINIC 
MCGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: ITS ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1991); HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Theodor Meron ed., 1991); and MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT 
ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS (1993); Partsch, supra note 6, at 209. 
 39. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.1. 
LERN-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:48 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2000 
914 
flects the Universal Declaration’s general orientation and trends.40 
This can be attributed to the slow drafting process and the impact of 
weighty philosophical and political issues on the process, including 
conversion, proselyting, and the conflict between universal human 
rights and cultural relativism. Although several other internationally 
binding instruments, some of which were widely ratified, contain 
provisions related to religious rights,41 the 1966 Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights is presently the only binding treaty specifically 
containing a coherent articulation of such rights.42 The Human 
Rights Committee, which implements the 1966 Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, also gave considerable attention to the subject, 
as evidenced by its issuance of a specific General Comment in 
1993.43 This Comment is of great value in interpreting religious 
norms. 
Articles 18, 19, 20, and 27 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights are relevant to religious rights.44 Article 18 is semi-
nal. The first paragraph generally tracks the language in Article 18 of 
the Universal Declaration, with minor changes.45 The Covenant’s 
Article 18 does not, however, explicitly refer to the right to change 
one’s religion.46 In an effort to compromise, it reads: “The right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion [the inner forum] . . . 
shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his 
choice.”47 Most specialists interpret the Covenant’s Article 18 as fully 
recognizing the right to change religion, as proclaimed by the Uni-
versal Declaration.48 But its failure to explicitly protect the right to 
change religion began a downward trend, which became more  
 
 
 40. See supra Part IV.C.1. 
 41. See Lerner, supra note 12, at 79. 
 42. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.1. 
 43. For its text, see Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 22, Article 18, 
48th Sess., U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.1, at 35 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 
22]. 
 44. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.7-170.8, 170.10. 
 45. See id. at 170.7. 
 46. See id.  
 47. Id. 
 48. See, e.g., Partsch, supra note 6, at 210-11; Martin Scheinin, Article 18, in THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY, supra note 16, at 263; J.A. 
Walkate, The Right of Everyone to Change His Religion or Belief, 30 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 146, 
153 (1983). 
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pronounced and very problematic during the preparation and adop-
tion of the 1981 Declaration. 
Article 18(2) prohibits “coercion” that would impair a person’s 
freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief.49 The text does not 
define “coercion,” but it should be read as meaning not only the use 
of force or threats but also more subtle forms of illegitimate influ-
ence, such as family considerations, public standing, and social rela-
tions. Use of such tactics is less than illegal, but so are some material 
enticements. 
Article 18(3) deals with limitations50 on the freedom to manifest 
one’s religion or belief “as are prescribed by law and are necessary to 
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of others.”51 Article 4 of the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights incorporates the whole of Article 18 as an article 
that cannot be derogated even in times of public emergency.52 
Significantly, Article 18 does not mention national security as an 
appropriate justification for religious discrimination by a state. In a 
delicate area such as religious rights, limitations must be interpreted 
narrowly. Article 18 only permits limitations upon manifestations or 
the practice of religion, namely the external forum, if such limitations 
are prescribed by law.53 The internal forum cannot be restricted or 
limited. This distinction is, of course, of the greatest importance. Ju-
dicial bodies in several countries have, out of necessity, intervened in 
religious practices such as the slaughtering of animals, the wearing of 
turbans, skullcaps, veils and head-coverings, the growing of beards, 
and work on specific days. Moreover, some religious groups’ rites, 
customs, and rules of behavior clash with public order and morality 
norms of the general population in areas such as education, health, 
gender, and family law. This is a delicate issue, in which there may be 
frequent clashes between what a society may consider its minimum  
 
 
 49. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8. 
 50. On limitations in the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, see Thomas 
Buergenthal, To Respect and to Ensure: State Obligations and Permissible Derogations, in THE 
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 72, 78-91, and Alexandre Charles Kiss, 
Permissible Limitations on Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 6, at 
290, 295-310. 
 51. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8. 
 52. See id. at 170.2. Articles 29(2) and 29(3) of the Universal Declaration on Human 
Rights are also relevant.  
 53. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8. 
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legal standard and minority religions’ religious attitudes grounded in 
history and culture.54 
The last paragraph of Article 18 deals with parental rights in the 
field of education, a highly sensitive area.55 The UNESCO Conven-
tion Against Discrimination in Education,56 the 1981 Declaration,57 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child,58 and other global and 
regional texts address this subject. International judicial or quasi-
judicial decisions on the topic have also been numerous. 
Article 19 deals generally with freedom of expression.59 Article 
20(2) imposes upon states that are parties to the 1966 Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights the duty to prohibit by law the advocacy of 
religious hatred that incites to discrimination, hostility, or violence.60 
Several states objected and entered reservations to Article 20(2), see-
ing in it a limitation on freedom of expression.61 Article 20(2) should 
be compared with Article 4 of the 1965 Convention.62 The Human 
Rights Committee, in its General Comment on Article 20, stressed 
Article 20(2)’s mandatory character and full compatibility with free-
dom of expression.63 
Article 27 deals with minorities, including religious minorities.64 
Scholars are divided on the merits of Article 27 and the scope of its 
protection.65 Moreover, Article 27 has, to some extent, been super-
seded by the 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Per-
 
 54. For an examination of these issues, see Leon Sheleff, Tribal Rites and Legal Rights, 
18 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 153 (1988); Aviam Soifer, Freedom of Association: 
Indian Tribes, Workers, and Communal Ghosts, 48 MD. L. REV. 350 (1989); and Donna J. 
Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework for Conflict Resolution, 
24 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 795 (1992). 
 55. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.8. 
 56. See id. at 330.1. 
 57. See id. at 490.1. 
 58. See id. at 423.1. 
 59. See id. at 170.8. 
 60. See id. 
 61. See SIEGHART, supra note 6, at 450, for details of reservations and interpretations 
entered to article 20. 
 62. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4. 
 63. See Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 11, Article 20, 19th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 12 (1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 11]. 
 64. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 170.10. 
 65. The controversy primarily concerns whether Article 27 protects only individuals or 
minority groups as well. Tomuschat takes the first view, while Ermacora, Dinstein, and Capo-
torti are in favor of a more group-oriented interpretation. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 15. 
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sons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Mi-
norities.66 It can also be argued that the 1992 Declaration is a rather 
timid approach to the issue of minorities’ rights.67 
The Human Rights Committee’s General Comment No. 22(48) 
on Article 18 stresses that the right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion is “far-reaching and profound.”68 Article 18 
protects theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not to pro-
fess any religion.69 It is not limited to traditional religions.70 It dis-
tinguishes between freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or be-
lief—protected unconditionally—from the freedom to manifest 
religion or belief.71 Paragraph 4 lists a broad range of acts encom-
passed in the freedom to manifest religion or belief, to be exercised 
individually or in community with others.72 The freedom to “have or 
to adopt” a religion or belief includes the right to replace one’s relig-
ion with another or to adopt atheistic views.73 Coercion in this re-
spect is barred.74 Paragraph 6 regards religious education and paren-
tal rights.75 Paragraph 7 reiterates the obligatory character of Article 
20 of the Covenant, which prohibits advocacy of religious hatred. 
Paragraph 8 permits limitations only if they are prescribed by law and 
are necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights of others.76 Article 18(3), on limitations, should 
be strictly interpreted.77 Paragraphs 9 and 10 address discrimination 
when there is a state religion or if a set of beliefs is treated as official 
ideology.78 Conscientious objection is the subject of Paragraph 11.79 
The General Comment on Article 18 should be viewed as an au-
thoritative interpretation of the scope of Article 18 by the body in 
 
 66. See 1 UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 140 (1994) [hereinafter  HUMAN RIGHTS]. 
 67. See LERNER, supra note 1, at 15. 
 68. See General Comment No. 22, supra note 43. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
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charge of implementation of the Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. It is also relevant to the interpretation of the 1981 Declara-
tion, to be discussed below. 
4. The 1981 Declaration80 
 Proclaimed by the General Assembly of the United Nations 
on November 25, 1981, the 1981 Declaration is presently the most 
important global instrument regarding religious rights. Although not 
binding, the 1981 Declaration, like all solemn declarations of the 
United Nations General Assembly, implies an expectation of obser-
vance. It has its origin, together with the draft convention still pend-
ing (“Draft Convention”), in the anti-Semitic events of 1959 and 
1960 (“swastika epidemics”) that prompted the United Nations to 
start its unfinished legislative process regarding manifestations of ra-
cial and religious discrimination and intolerance.81 The reasons for 
the United Nations’ delayed action regarding religious freedoms 
have been recounted repeatedly, and the reasons for the interruption 
of the drafting of a convention in the areas of religion or belief are 
well known.82 International politics have undoubtedly played a major 
role. In light of this, the 1981 Declaration is clearly the United Na-
tions’ most ambitious achievement in this sphere to date, despite the 
fact that most of its provisions already exist in other binding instru-
ments. The 1981 Declaration permits measures of implementation. 
Various Special Rapporteurs have already been appointed, and those 
Special Rapporteurs have produced an extremely valuable body of in-
formation. The system requires improvement, but its usefulness is 
obvious. 
The 1981 Declaration took a clear stand with regard to the scope 
of the term “religion.” The 1981 Declaration defines “religion” to 
 
 80. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.1. 
 81. General Assembly Resolution 1510 (XV), dated Dec. 12, 1960. For the work of the 
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities after the inci-
dents, see U.N. Doc. No. E/CN.4/800, para. 163 (1960); and Resolutions 3(XII) and 
6(XVI) on the Commission of Human Rights (1960).  For an analysis of the 1981 Declara-
tion, see LERNER, supra note 10, at 75-96; and Donna J. Sullivan, Advancing the Freedom of 
Religion or Belief Through the UN Declaration on the Elimination of Religious Intolerance and 
Discrimination, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 487 (1988). 
 82. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 46. For the reasons why the United Nations treated 
religious issues differently than other human rights issues, see also Antonio Cassese, The Gen-
eral Assembly: Historical Perspective 1945-1989, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN 
RIGHTS, supra note 38, at 37. 
LERN-FIN.DOC 9/25/00  9:48 PM 
905] Nature and Minimum Standards 
 919 
include “beliefs,” namely nontheistic convictions related to religion, 
such as atheism, rationalism, agnosticism, and other “beliefs,” pro-
vided those convictions are related to religion.83 Beliefs related to 
politics, social, or economic issues are not included. The controversy 
regarding issues of conversion and proselyting, present at all stages in 
the 1981 Declaration’s preparation, threatened to prevent the Gen-
eral Assembly from adopting the Declaration. The controversy, how-
ever, was remedied by a compromise incorporated into Article 8 of 
the 1981 Declaration, which preserves the applicability of the norms 
of the Universal Declaration and the 1966 Covenants.84 This contro-
versy nevertheless weakened the text of the 1981 Declaration. Two 
decades of protracted and difficult negotiations were required to 
reach a compromise. Even if one accepts the view of commentators 
who consider the differences in wording between the Universal Dec-
laration and the 1981 Declaration to be insubstantial, one cannot 
ignore the argument that the differences may prevent the Declara-
tion from being viewed as part of customary law applicable to some 
societies. 
One of the deficiencies of the 1981 Declaration is the imprecise 
use of the terms “discrimination,” clearly a legal concept, and “intol-
erance,” a rather vague concept referring essentially to emotional, 
psychological, philosophical, and other attitudes likely to generate 
discrimination, hatred, or persecution.85 In fact, the 1981 Declara-
tion gives both words equivalent meaning.86 Moreover, the 1981 
Declaration, unlike the Draft Convention, does not incorporate pro-
visions on incitement to intolerance or discrimination on religious 
grounds. The need and desire to compromise in drafting the 1981 
Declaration are reflected in the references to conversion, missionary 
activities and the right to teach and propagate a religion, and the 
right to leave a religion. They continue the descent already men-
tioned in the above discussion on the respective provisions in the 
 
 83. See LERNER, supra note 10, at 80-81. 
 84. See id. 
 85. WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE, 
(1971), defines “intolerant” as “refusing to allow others the free enjoyment of their opinions 
or worship.” Elizabeth Odio Benito, Study of the Current Dimensions of the Problems of Intoler-
ance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/26, at 3 
(1987), states that manifestations of intolerance, often extending far beyond discrimination, 
include stirring up hatred against or even persecuting individuals or groups of a different relig-
ion or belief.   
 86. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.2. 
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1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The prohibition of dis-
crimination is vague and requires further elaboration. Not every 
preference based on religion or belief is discriminatory. For example, 
comparative legislation on religious rights sometimes prefers relig-
ions, treats religions differently, and draws distinctions between relig-
ions that respond to social and historic realities. In some cases, legis-
lation may be discriminatory; in other cases, it may not. Common 
sense is the key, particularly since the 1981 Declaration prohibits dis-
crimination, not only by the state, but also by institutions, groups, 
and persons.87 
Despite these shortcomings, the 1981 Declaration text consti-
tutes a far-reaching catalog of generally recognized human rights re-
lated to religion or belief. Where the 1981 Declaration is unclear, 
authoritative interpretations of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Po-
litical Rights are helpful.88 The 1981 Declaration follows the pattern 
of the Covenant in drawing the distinction between basic rights in 
the inner forum—thought, conscience, and religion—and the exter-
nal manifestations of religion—worship, observance, practice, and 
teaching.89 Only external manifestations, which are in some cases 
listed, may be limited if such limitations are prescribed by law and 
necessary to protect public safety, order, health or morals, or the 
fundamental rights of others.90 The 1981 Declaration does not dis-
tinguish the rights of nationals and the rights of aliens. 
The catalog of religious rights is listed in the comprehensive, but 
not exhaustive, text of Article 6.91 It includes the right to worship 
and assemble and to maintain places for this purpose; to establish in-
stitutions; to make, acquire, and use materials necessary to the relig-
ion; to produce relevant publications; to teach the religion in suitable 
places; to receive financial contributions; to train and appoint appro-
priate leaders; to observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and 
ceremonies; and to communicate with individuals and communities 
 
 87. See id. 
 88. See, e.g., Partsch, supra note 6; General Comment No. 22, supra note 43. 
 89. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3-490.4. 
 90. See id. at 490.2. On several occasions, the Human Rights Committee and the Euro-
pean Court on Human Rights dealt with the scope of permissible limitations. The European 
Court clarified the meaning of “morals” in Handyside v. UK, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
(1976). 
 91. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3-.4. 
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on religious matters at the national and international levels.92 Some 
of these same rights appear in Articles 16 and 17 of the Conference 
on Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (“CSCE”) 1989 Conclud-
ing Document of the Vienna meeting.93 
 On the whole, the 1981 Declaration is a reasonably good text, 
which, more or less, reflects the international community’s present 
understanding of the minimum standard for matters of religious 
rights. It is to be noted that the Special Rapporteurs appointed since 
1986 have been performing the role usually assigned to formal 
mechanisms incorporated into mandatory treaties.94 There is cer-
tainly room for improvement, and some recommendations have been 
advanced to that effect. But this does not detract from the positive 
aspects of the document, which enlarges the scope of specific articles 
in the obligatory 1966 Covenants. So long as no progress is made on 
the Draft Convention, and there are no signs of such progress, the 
1981 Declaration is a very positive step in the international effort to 
ensure human religious rights. 
5. Other global provisions 
International human rights should be viewed as a universal, all-
embracing system of rights. The specific provisions on religion and 
belief must be considered in connection with other norms adopted 
by the international community and with regional instruments regu-
lating religion or belief in some parts of the world. Religion is a 
wide-reaching spiritual, social, and political phenomenon. Many fac-
ets of life are covered by rules dealing with religion or belief. 
For these reasons, after the adoption of the United Nations 
Charter and the early instruments directly concerned with issues in-
volving religion or belief, such as the Genocide Convention and the 
Universal Declaration, many international law documents, although 
mainly directed toward the protection of other specific rights, also 
 
 92. See id. However, rights considered but omitted include the rights to observe dietary 
practices, to make pilgrimages, and not to be coerced to take an oath of a religious nature.  
 93. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 403 (1995) 
(emphasizing the rights of religious communities in Principle 16.4); see also W. COLE 
DURHAM, JR., FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: LAWS AFFECTING THE STRUCTURING OF 
RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES (1999). 
 94. Not being a treaty, the 1981 Declaration did not establish such a mechanism. The 
Reports submitted by the Special Rapporteurs do not differ, however, from similar documents 
to be submitted under treaty obligations. 
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address religious rights. Among those international law documents, 
the following deserve mentioning: 
• The Genocide Convention.95 
• Humanitarian law, consolidated in the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and 1977 Protocols.96 
• The Declaration and Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination.97 This is an appropri-
ate guideline for state action in the field of religious 
prejudice, intolerance, and discrimination, which includes 
the difficult subject of prohibiting and incriminating 
group discrimination, incitement, and hatred in general. 
• The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women.98 It is impossible to 
ignore the clash between gender equality and religious 
practices difficult to eliminate from some traditions, par-
ticularly where the personal status law is part of the law of 
the state.99 
• The 1960 UNESCO Convention Against Discrimination 
in Education.100 This contains norms on the establish-
ment of separate educational systems for religious reasons 
and on parental rights.101 These norms should be com-
pared to those included in the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child102 and have been the subject of frequent ju-
dicial or quasi-judicial adjudication.103 
• The 1958 International Labor Organization Convention 
(No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Em-
 
 95. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1. See supra Part IV.C 
and infra Part IV.E for discussions of the Genocide Convention. 
 96. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 70.1, 80.1, 90.1, 100.1, 
200.1, 210.1. 
 97. See id. at 160.1. 
 98. See id. at 220.1. On the Convention generally, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN 
RIGHTS LAW-MAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 53 (1986). 
 99. See Sullivan, supra note 54, at 795. This article contains an extensive bibliography 
on women’s rights. See also HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 71-117 (Kath-
leen E. Mahoney & Paul Mahoney eds., 1993). 
 100. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 330.1. 
 101. See id. at 330.2. 
 102. See id. at 423.3. 
 103. See, e.g., Belgian Linguistic Case, 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 35 (1968); Kjeldsen et. 
al., 23 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1976); Angelini v. Sweden, 10 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 
123 (1988). 
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ployment and Occupation.104 The quasi-judicial supervi-
sory bodies of the International Labor Organization 
(“ILO”) had to deal, on many occasions, with issues re-
garding religious rights of employees, frequently in con-
nection with holy days and days of rest.105 Another inter-
esting ILO treaty in this context is the 1989 Convention 
(No. 169) Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in 
Independent Countries,106 a partial revision of the 1957 
Convention. The new instrument, strongly group-
oriented, protects the identities (including religious) of 
indigenous populations with a view toward ensuring re-
spect for the religious and spiritual values and practices of 
the interested populations as groups and as individuals.107  
• The 1990 U.N. International Convention on the Protec-
tion of the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families.108 This convention contains provisions for 
the satisfaction of the cultural and religious needs of such 
migrants and contains an article inspired by Article 18 of 
the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.109 
• The 1992 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and 
Linguistic Minorities.110 This declaration implies some 
progress as compared to Article 27 of the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. Its relationship to religious 
rights is limited. 
While many of the listed provisions are consistent with the 
minimum standard111 for religious rights, contradictory rules (and in 
 
 104. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 320.1. 
 105. For the work of the ILO and its struggle against discrimination, see generally N. 
Valticos, The International Labor Organization, in 1 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 363 (Karel Vasak ed., 1979). 
 106. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 475. For an analysis of the 1989 Convention 
(No. 169) concerning Indigenous and Tribal Populations or Peoples, see LERNER, supra note 
10, at 99-114.  
 107. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 475. 
 108. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 554. 
 109. See id. For a critical analysis, see Ved P. Nanda, The Protection of the Rights of Mi-
grant Workers, 2 ASIAN AND PAC. MIGRATION J. 161 (1993). 
 110. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 140. For a comparison with other provisions 
on minorities, see LERNER, supra note 1, at 33-35. 
 111. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST FOR 
CONSENSUS 6 (Abdullah Ahmed An-Naim ed., 1992); Fernando R. Teson, International 
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some cases even divergent principles) have developed in areas such as 
gender and minority rights. This, again, raises the issue of universal-
ity versus cultural relativism with respect to some major religions, 
new religions, and sects in particular. 
6. Regional norms and special agreements112 
A study of religious rights cannot ignore the following: the 1950 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms;113 the 1969 American Convention on Hu-
man Rights;114 the documents adopted by the Organization (for-
merly Conference) on Security and Co-operation in Europe;115 and 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.116 These in-
struments should be compared to the global rules. 
At the European level particularly, a comprehensive and impor-
tant jurisprudence has developed as a consequence of the work of the 
European Court and former European Commission on Human 
Rights. These European bodies adjudicated issues such as the man-
datory use of crash helmets, compulsory membership in health ser-
vices, compulsory insurance, religious needs of prisoners, the status 
of religious congregations, the rights of the clergy, parental rights, 
conscientious objection, taxation, blasphemy, the status of minor 
and new religious groups, and the relationship between churches and 
their members.117 This created an interesting body of jurisprudence 
 
Human Rights and Cultural Relativism, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 42-
51 (Richard Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 2d ed. 1992); Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativ-
ism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400 (1984). Volume 16(2) of the Human 
Rights Quarterly carries several articles on the subject. See 16 HUM. RTS. QT. 235 (1994). 
 112. An in-depth discussion of the protection of religious rights by regional instruments 
is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 113. See 213 U.N.T.S. 211 (1993). There is vast literature on the protection of human 
rights in Europe. For a recent comprehensive book, see EVANS, supra note 1. 
 114. See 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970). On the American system generally, see THOMAS 
BUERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE AMERICAS (1995); SCOTT 
DAVIDSON, THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM (1997). 
 115. For the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (“OSCE”) docu-
ments, see COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 93. For a discussion of the OSCE’s work in gen-
eral, see THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE (Arie Bloed ed., 
1993). See also DURHAM, supra note 93. 
 116. For the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, see 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982). 
See also U. OJI UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS 
(1997). 
 117. See generally, EVANS, supra note 1. 
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and contributed to the interpretation of the basic rules concerning 
religious rights. The issue of new religions and sects has recently be-
come very controversial in Europe, and a recent Council of Europe 
statement regarding this issue has drawn attention.118 Principles 16 
and 17 of the 1989 Concluding Document of the Vienna Meeting 
of the CSCE deserve special mention also because of their detailed 
coverage of religious rights.119 These principles should be compared 
with those religious rights listed in the 1981 Declaration. 
Although not precisely regional arrangements, some states have 
entered into bilateral agreements with churches and religious com-
munities, providing a framework for the solution and clarification of 
different problems in this area. Spain, for instance, has entered into 
such agreements with different religious communities.120 Also note-
worthy is the 1993 agreement between the State of Israel and the 
Holy See preceding the establishment of diplomatic relations be-
tween them.121 This agreement refers to the protection of Catholic 
interests in Israel and to the Catholic Church’s condemnation of 
anti-Semitism.122 The agreement has been described as the first 
agreement between the Holy See and a non-Christian state.123 
D. Protection from Persecution 
Although international law adequately addressed racial discrimi-
nation (though the issue of implementation is not always resolved 
satisfactorily), there remains a strongly felt need to protect religious 
groups from discrimination, persecution, and incitement.124 Interna-
 
 118. See Official Press Release of the Council of Europe, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE 
COUNCIL (June 1999). 
 119. See COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 93. 
 120. See SPANISH LEGISLATION ON RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS (Alberto de la Hera & Rosa 
María Martízez de Codes eds., 1998). 
 121. See Holy See-Israel: Fundamental Agreement, 33 I.L.M. 153 (1994). 
 122. See id. 
 123. See Silvio Ferrari, Concordats were Born in the West, 12/13 LA PORTA D’ORIENTE 
37-44 (1998); Natan Lerner, Protecting Religious Human Rights by Bilateral Arrangements, 
12/13 LA PORTA D’ORIENTE 45-55 (1998). 
 124. The controversial International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
292, 112 Stat. 2787 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 6401 (1998)), calls upon the President of the 
United States to take a range of diplomatic and other actions against any country that engages 
in or tolerates violations of religious freedom. See id. at § 6441. See also the detailed list of vio-
lations of religious rights in many countries included in the reports of Special Rapporteur, Ab-
delfattah Amor, supra note 4. See also FREEDOM OF RELIGION AND BELIEF: A WORLD 
REPORT (Kevin Boyle & Juliet Sheen eds., 1997), which covers persecution against various 
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tional and domestic law must also address the defamation and libel 
of groups or of persons belonging to a group for their membership 
in the group, even though such defamation and libel is less dramatic 
than physical persecution.125 
The developing trend is to make the prohibition of religious dis-
crimination, like the prohibition of racial discrimination, a peremp-
tory norm of international law or, in other words, jus cogens.126 Ha-
tred and intolerance, admittedly less precise terms, are mentioned in 
some provisions addressing incitement to hatred, intolerance, and 
other related evils. But it is still necessary to harmonize basic rights, 
such as freedom of speech or of association on the one hand, and, on 
the other hand, the right of collective entities and their members not 
to be subjected to libel, defamation, hostility, intolerance, or incite-
ment to hatred. The highly relevant issue of whether punishment 
should be enhanced for crimes committed on religious or racial 
grounds must also be resolved. 
The various instruments referenced above contain provisions to 
protect religious and other groups. The Genocide Convention, for 
example, protects religious groups’ right to exist.127 Similarly, Article 
19 of the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political Rights authorizes 
limitations upon the freedom of expression to protect “the rights 
and reputations of others.”128 Article 20 prohibits the advocacy of 
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility, or violence.129 The Human Rights Committee, 
in its General Comment on Article 20, affirms that the prohibition is 
fully compatible with other freedoms.130 Likewise, Articles 10(2) and 
11(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights restrict the 
freedom of expression, assembly, and association when necessary in a 
 
religious groups in different countries. 
 125. On this controversial issue, see, for example, Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Harm Prin-
ciple, Offence Principle, and the Skokie Affair, 41 POL. STUD. 453 (1993); Kenneth Lasson, 
Racial Defamation as Free Speech: Abusing the First Amendment, 17 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 11 (1985); and Natan Lerner, Group Libel Revisited, 17 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 184 (1987). 
 126. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 513 n.29 (4th 
ed. 1990). 
 127. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 130.1. 
 128. Id. at 170.8 
 129. See id. 
 130. General Comment No. 11, supra note 63. 
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democratic society to “protect[] . . . the reputation . . . of others.”131 
The American Convention on Human Rights refers to the right of 
“everyone” to have his honor and dignity respected, liability to pro-
tect the “reputations of others,” and penalties for “advocat[ing] . . . 
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute[s] incitement[] to 
lawless violence or to any other similar action against any person or 
group of persons on any grounds including those of race, color, re-
ligion, language, or national origin.”132 The 1981 Declaration calls 
upon states to take “all necessary measures . . . to . . . combat dis-
crimination on the ground of religion or belief.”133 The 1978 
UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice urges the mass 
media and all organized groups to refrain from presenting “a stereo-
typed, partial, unilateral or tendentious picture of individuals and of 
various human groups.”134 The 1990 Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe states the determination of its signatories “to combat all 
forms of racial and ethnic hatred, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, and 
discrimination against anyone, as well as persecution on religious and 
ideological grounds.”135 
The main provisions prohibiting incitement against groups, 
communities, and collective entities are contained in the United Na-
tions Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Dis-
crimination (“1965 Convention”), ratified by 155 states as of Au-
gust 1999.136 Article 4 of the 1965 Convention contains provisions 
concerning incitement, hatred, and hostility against persons and 
groups.137 It is a controversial article and was subject to criticism and 
formal reservations. Article 4 has, however, become an important 
guideline for states, and several have enacted domestic legislation in 
 
 131. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 10(2), 213 U.N.T.S. 222. 
 132. American Convention on Human Rights, July 18, 1978, 9 I.L.M. 673.  
 133. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 490.3. 
 134. See HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 66, at 132. 
 135. See 2 UNITED NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTRUMENTS 406 (1994). 
 136. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.1; see generally NATAN 
LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION: A COMMENTARY (1970); G. Tenekides, L’Action des Nationes Unies Contre 
la Discrimination Raciale, RECUEIL DES COURS III 269 (1980). See also the Reports of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the most recent of which 
(at the time of publication of this Article) is indexed as U.N. Doc. A/54/18 (1999).  
 137. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4. 
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the spirit of its provisions.138 Article 4 is undoubtedly relevant to re-
ligious rights. Its text was a compromise between, on the one hand, 
those who sought primarily to penalize not only “incitement to dis-
crimination” but also the “dissemination of ideas based on racial su-
periority or hatred,” and, on the other hand, those who considered 
such penalties a threat to the basic freedoms of speech and associa-
tion.139 As is frequently the case with such compromise, the text 
adopted is not entirely satisfactory and contains shortcomings. 
Nevertheless, the obligations that Article 4 imposes are consid-
ered mandatory. State parties are bound to enact implementation 
legislation in accordance with it, even if they allege that racial dis-
crimination or racist organizations do not exist in their jurisdic-
tion.140 However, in order to avoid interpretations that states might 
consider incompatible with their constitutional systems, the opening 
paragraph of Article 4 contains a sentence clarifying that measures to 
be adopted shall be “with due regard to the principles embodied in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”141 Nevertheless, where 
rights clash, the orientation of Article 4 is that freedom of speech or 
association cannot be invoked to prevent a state from taking legal 
measures, including penal action, against violations of the 1965 
Convention. 
Article 4 is presently one of the most ambitious provisions in in-
ternational law intended to fight not only racial discrimination but all 
related evils, such as racial hatred, racial propaganda, and associations 
with a racist purpose.142 Even though there are few references to re-
ligion in the text of the 1965 Convention (because of the decision to 
separate the instruments on race from those on religion), it seems 
beyond any doubt that Article 4 acts as a guideline to interpret the 
provisions of the 1981 Declaration. 
E. International Criminal Law 
Post-war international law had to respond to the lessons of the 
most costly conflict in history, in terms of human lives. Those con-
 
 138. See JOSE D. INGLES, STUDY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE 4 OF THE 
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, U.N. Sales 
No. E.85.XIV.2 (1986). 
 139. LERNER, supra note 1, at 53. 
 140. See INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS, supra note 13, at 160.3-160.4. 
 141. Id.  
 142. See id. 
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structing an international order to preserve peace and prevent hor-
rendous crimes, like those committed before and during World War 
II, were conscious of the need to avoid the recurrence of criminal 
policies directed against specific groups, religious or otherwise. One 
of the first human rights treaties adopted by the United Nations was 
the Genocide Convention,143 discussed above. The Nuremberg trials 
influenced the Genocide Convention. As stated by the International 
Court of Justice, it “was manifestly adopted for a purely humanitar-
ian and civilizing purpose” with the intention “to condemn and pun-
ish genocide as a crime under international law involving a denial of 
the right of existence of entire human groups, a denial which shocks 
the conscience of mankind and results in great losses to human-
ity.”144 
Today, the prohibition of genocide is part of jus cogens. The 
Genocide Convention does not contain measures of implementation. 
Moreover, it has exercised little influence in preventing clear-cut 
genocidal situations affecting religious and other groups in various 
parts of the world over the past few decades. The Genocide Conven-
tion needs updating, but, on the whole, it is one of the basic instru-
ments protecting ethnic and religious groups and addressing those 
groups’ fundamental right to preserve their existence. 
In the 1990s, the international community had to confront the 
tragic events in former Yugoslavia known as “ethnic cleansing.” A 
large body of documents, literature, and decisions dealing with the 
events in this context, including those of the International Court of 
Justice, already exists.145 It should be emphasized that the issue is 
wider than pure “ethnicity” in its strictest sense. United Nations 
Rapporteurs pointed out the severe damage suffered by religious and 
cultural monuments and sites of the different religions. “Such wan-
ton destruction,” wrote Angelo Vidal d’Almeida Ribeiro, “appears to 
be part of the policy of certain groups aimed at eradicating the reli-
gious and cultural base of ethnic communities living in a given area 
 
 143. See id. at 130.1. 
 144. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide Case, 1970 I.C.J. 15, 23. 
 145. The United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, as well as other United 
Nations organs and treaty bodies, adopted numerous resolutions on ethnic cleansing. See, e.g., 
Natan Lerner, Ethnic Cleansing, 24 ISRAEL YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (1994); 
Theodor Meron, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, 72 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 122 
(1993); James C. O’Brien, The International Tribunal for Violation of International Humani-
tarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 AM. J. INT’L L. 639 (1993). 
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in order to encourage their departure and prevent their eventual re-
turn.”146 
As a result of these events, the Security Council established an in-
ternational tribunal under Security Resolution 808 on February 22, 
1993 “for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious viola-
tions of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of 
the former Yugoslavia since 1991.”147 The Security Council, invok-
ing Chapter VII of the Charter, established the international tribunal 
because of the threat to peace, the need for expedience, and the need 
to create an effective and binding obligation to take action as re-
quired.148 The Security Council also adopted the international tribu-
nal’s statute. The Security Council followed the same procedure in 
establishing an international tribunal for similar crimes committed in 
Rwanda.149 
Both international tribunals are ad hoc institutions. They are the 
first international courts dealing with war crimes and crimes against 
humanity since the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials. In 1998, an inter-
national conference convened by the United Nations in Rome de-
cided by a large majority to create a permanent international criminal 
court to deal with war crimes and crimes against humanity.150 Such 
crimes are frequently committed for religious or ethno-religious rea-
sons. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to summarize the steps taken in inter-
national law to guarantee freedom of religion or belief. There is no 
generally agreed-upon definition of “religion,” mainly because of the 
desire to avoid ideological confrontations. There is, however, agree-
ment that in modern human rights law the word “religion,” usually 
followed by the word “belief” refers to theistic convictions involving 
 
 146. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1993/62, at 119. A spokesman for the U.N. High Commis-
sioner for Refugees accused Serbians of “erasing all traces of a Muslim religious and cultural 
presence.” Chuck Sudetic, U.N. Says ‘Ethnic Cleansing’ by Serbs Intensifies, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
30, 1994, at A13. 
 147. See 32 I.L.M. 1159-1205 (1993), containing the Secretary General’s Report and 
Security Council resolutions. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Security Council Resolution 955 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994). 
 150. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (as corrected by the procès-verbaux of Nov. 10, 
1998 and July 12, 1999). 
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a transcendental view of the universe and a normative code of behav-
ior as well as atheistic, agnostic, rationalistic, and other views in 
which such elements are absent. “Beliefs,” in this context, always re-
late to religion and exclude beliefs of a different character in the po-
litical or social fields. 
The international community has not adopted a specific manda-
tory treaty regarding religion. There is a draft that was under nego-
tiation for several years, but it is doubtful that work on the draft will 
resume in the near future. The discussion about its need has been in-
conclusive. Different alternatives to the treaty have been submitted, 
anticipating that such a treaty may encounter objections from states 
and major religious communities. On the one hand, some fear that 
pushing for a convention may result in a low common denominator 
and a limited number of ratifications. On the other hand, some ar-
gue that there is obvious value in a treaty that goes beyond the arti-
cles on religious rights in the 1966 Covenant on Political and Civil 
Rights and incorporates most of the principles of the 1981 Declara-
tion. The idea of the 1965 Convention as a model is stimulating, al-
though the situations and factors influencing both areas are un-
doubtedly quite different. 
Article 18 of the Universal Declaration and Article 18 of the 
1966 Covenant on Political and Civil Rights are the basic provisions 
in the global instruments addressing religious freedom. The 1981 
Declaration, although not obligatory, contains widely accepted in-
ternational standards. Some of those provisions are customary inter-
national law, and a few should be seen as jus cogens, namely a rule 
which cannot be altered except by the will of the international com-
munity as a whole. 
There is also a monitoring system. The General Comments of 
the Human Rights Committee, the reports and studies submitted by 
U.N. Special Rapporteurs, the development of a reporting system, 
the judicial and quasi-judicial decisions addressing some very signifi-
cant issues in the area of religion, the special arrangements between 
some states and religious communities or religiously-originated or 
oriented communities together provide a reasonable degree of pro-
tection and provide guarantees in the tense, delicate, and explosive 
area of basic religious rights. 
Pending problems are numerous. They include the issue of con-
version and proselyting, opting-out of religious communities, con-
scientious objection (not necessarily a religious issue), and the clash 
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between rights in the field of religion or belief and those in other 
spheres. Evidence of the tension, delicacy, and explosiveness of these 
issues abounds. It can be seen in the struggle of the universal accep-
tance and understanding of human rights and what is loosely called 
cultural particularism or relativism against the dangers of wars, geno-
cide, and persecution stemming from religious sentiments or hatred, 
of which the horrible practices of “ethnic cleansing” have been a very 
recent and tragic example. Some steps in the field of international 
criminal law directly relate to these excesses in matters of religious 
rights. Indeed, the most powerful state in today’s world has felt the 
need to enact unilateral protective measures against religious perse-
cution abroad. 
The renewed interest in the field of religious rights is a positive 
development that requires an adequate, practical legislative response. 
It presents a fascinating challenge for lawyers, political scientists, and 
theologians. The international community must strive to reach a 
consensus to incorporate rights related to religion into the widely 
developed system of international human rights. Such consensus was 
attained in other delicate areas affecting the sensibilities of large 
groups. The new millennium is a propitious moment to review this 
issue and renew work on it. No group is expected to renounce its 
principles and basic ideology. However, because they are so impor-
tant, religion or belief deserve an intelligent, careful, and balanced 
accommodation in fundamental legal norms that provide a minimum 
standard acceptable to a large majority of mankind. The instruments 
discussed in this article contain many ingredients of such a standard. 
